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The 2004 Revision of 
Criminal Law in North 
Korea:  — a take-off? 
In Sup Han∗ 
I.  Introduction 
On 29 April 2004, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereinafter 
called “DPRK,” “North Korea,” or “NK”) revised its Criminal Law.  Since its 
original enactment in 1950,1 the DPRK’s Criminal Law has been revised five 
times: 1974, 1987, 1995, 1999, and 2004.  Along with the revision of the Criminal 
Law, the Criminal Procedure Act was also revised on May 6, 2004.  The scale of 
the 2004 Criminal Law revision was voluminous.  The number of articles was 
nearly doubled to 303 and its ideological tone was diluted. 
The law in practice in NK cannot be presumed from a knowledge of the law in 
code.  Rather, we can read the regime’s changing concerns by the code changes in 
NK.  The 2004 revision would be a clue for understanding how NK authorities are 
conscious of the recent social change, how they evaluate the seriousness of the 
specific activities, and how they plan their strategy of control.  In retrospect, the 
1974 revision of the Criminal Law was a culmination of totalitarian iron fists.  
Since then, criminal law has progressed gradually.  The recent revisions have been 
made at short intervals.  The 2004 revision in particular suggests the possibility of 
a qualitative take-off compared with other previous changes.  As soon as the 
contents of the revision were reported at the end of 2004, it was especially noticed 
 
∗ Associate Professor, College of Law, Seoul National University. 
 
 1. See generally Pyong Choon Hahm, Ideology and Criminal Law in North Korea, 17 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 77 (1969); Koo-Chin Kang, An Analytical Study of Criminal Law in North 
Korea, 4 LAWASIA (JOURNAL OF THE LAW ASSOCIATION FOR ASIA AND THE WESTERN 
PACIFIC) 1 (1973).  Both articles contain English language analysis of the NK 1950 
Criminal Law. 
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by the international community which has expressed grave concerns about the 
human rights situation in NK.2  The information available is scarce, and our 
analysis is mostly based on the published text of the code,3 added to by some 
witnesses.  The NK government officially published the Code of DPRK in August 
2004, which contained the revised versions of the Criminal Law and the Criminal 
Procedure in 2004. 
Here, I describe the changing contents of the 2004 revision, explain the 
background of such a change, and analyze what theoretical and practical 
implications the new revision holds for the present and future of NK. 
II.  Analogy Repealed 
NK’s Criminal Law has been blamed especially because it expressly allowed 
the analogy in the application of Criminal Law.4  It is most conspicuous that the 
 
 2. U.N. Comm. on Human Rights [hereinafter U.N.C.H.R.], Question of the Violations of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, 61st Sess., Agenda 
Item 9 (Apr. 11, 2005), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ 
 G05/101/97/PDF/G0510197.pdf?OpenElement.  The latest news is the adoption by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights of a resolution (E/CN.4/2005/L.30) on the Situation of 
Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Apr.14, 2005).  By this 
resolution, the Commission expressed its deep concern about continuing reports of 
systemic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the DPRK, including torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, public executions, 
extrajudicial and arbitrary detention; sanctions on citizens of the DPRK who had been 
repatriated from abroad, such as treating their departure as treason leading to punishments 
of internment, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or the death penalty.  See also 
U.N.C.H.R, 61st Sess., 50th mtg. at 4-5, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ 
 GEN/ G05/138/89/PDF/G0513889.pdf?OpenElement.  Of course, NK strongly opposed its 
adoption.  The representative of DPRK said DPRK categorically rejected the present draft 
resolution, which had been fabricated by hostile forces and their followers, with the aim of 
stifling his country.  The draft represented an extreme manifestation of the politicization, 
selectivity and double standards.  Its fundamental purpose was to overthrow the state 
system of the DPRK. 
 3. The 2004 Compilation of the Codebook of DPRK contains 1095 pages and 112 codes that 
have been enacted or revised since 1990.  To my knowledge, the only prior compilation 
found was prepared in 2000 (Gong-wha-guk Bup-Jeon (2000) [Codebook of DPRK in 
2000]) and includes 103 codes.  The cover to the 2004 compilation includes the notation 
“dea-jung-yon” [for the general public].  It would be disputable whether this publication 
would be really used for the NK citizens or for the outsiders, or for both.  It is certain that 
they constitute the present codes in NK, regardless of their degree of implementation.  See 
Chosun minjuju-eui in-min gong-wha-guk Bup-Jeon [Codebook of DPRK in 2004], Bup-
rul-chul-pan-sa (2004).  [Ed. note: certain citations in this article have not been translated 
into English, but are available in original Korean text at cited source.] 
 4. Tong-il yeon-gu-won, Bukhan Inkwon Bak-seo 2004, [WHITE PAPER ON THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 2004].  The White Paper provides a typical criticism of NK 
Criminal Law, pointing out that “the Criminal Law was regarded as a kind of secret 
document, and the NK authority did not open its Criminal Law to its people.  Undemocratic 
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2004 revision articulated the legal principle called “nullum crimen sine lege.”  
Article 6 says, “[o]nly offenses which are clarified under the provisions of 
Criminal Law shall be criminally accountable by the state.”  This article shows a 
contrast with the former provisions which included analogy in the application of 
Criminal Law.  Before 2004, NK Criminal Law said, “[w]hen a person committed 
a criminal act for which there is no specific provision in this Law, his offense shall 
be punished according to a provision dealing with a criminal offense that is the 
most similar in its type and gravity of danger.”5  Analogy in Criminal Law might 
endanger civil liberties because Criminal Law could be interpreted widely or 
vaguely by judicial power.  The immediate effect of the repeal of analogy was the 
more specific articulation of the individual clauses, and as a result, their numbers 
were conspicuously increased. 
Comparatively speaking, the provision of analogy in criminal law was 
characteristic of law-making in former socialist countries.  The analogy doctrine 
was first embodied in Article 16 of the Criminal Code of the Soviet Republic in 
1926.  The Soviet Republic has since repealed all of the old regime’s codes and the 
new Criminal Code granted the Court the power to apply an analogy to a case 
which was substantially criminal, but in which there was no provision directly 
applicable.  The new socialist countries needed the legal skill of analogy in order 
to fill the loopholes caused by the annulment of the laws under the old regime.  In 
1958, when the de-Stalinization movement was in full-swing, the analogy clause 
was repealed by the Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law.6 
China underwent a similar process.  When the People’s Republic of China 
enacted the first comprehensive Criminal Law in 1979, it included an analogy 
clause,7 confessing that China was not so mature as to legally stipulate all offenses.  
A defense was given, however, that the clause of analogy was rarely applied to 
 
and pre-modern practices have been sustained in the Criminal law.  Analogy was allowed.  
Retroactive application was permitted, and the statute of limitation was negated.”  [See Ed. 
note, supra, note 4.] 
 5. The 1950 Criminal Law, art. 9 (1950) (N. Korea); The 1987 Criminal Law, art. 10 (1950) 
(N. Korea).  See Bukhan Buplungsip [Codebook of North Korea] 722 (Jung Kyung-Mo ed., 
Daeruk Yeonguso, Vol. 4, 1990).  [See Ed. note, supra, note 4.] 
 6. Christopher Osakwe, Due Process of Law and Civil Rights Cases in the Soviet Union, in 
SOVIET LAW AFTER STALIN, PART I 179, 186 (Donald D. Barry et al. eds., 1977). 
 7. See THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 46 (Chin Kim trans., 
Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1982).  Criminal Law, Article 79: A Crime not specifically 
prescribed under the specific provisions of the present law may be confirmed a crime and 
sentence rendered in light of the most analogous article under the special provisions of the 
present law; provide, however, that the case shall be submitted to the Supreme People’s 
Court for its approval. 
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cases in action.  By 1997, the revised Criminal Law, Art. 3, says, “anyone who 
commits an act deemed a crime by explicit stipulations of law shall be convicted 
and given punishment by law, and any act not deemed a crime by explicit 
stipulations of law shall not be convicted or given punishment.”8  One official 
commentary expresses that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege is one of the 
most universally acknowledged legal principles and the vast majority of nations in 
the world have acknowledged it.  Its great significance lies in preventing judicial 
arbitrariness and guaranteeing the legal rights of the people.9  When it was 
articulated in China, the 1997 Law tripled the articles of the Special Provisions 
from 103 to 350. 
The paths of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China were 
followed by the NK Criminal Law.  The first clause of NK Criminal Law in 1950 
started as a simple clause of analogy.  It then changed into a clause of analogy, 
limited by a proviso in 1987, and now has finally been repealed, accompanied by 
the doubled numbers of articles of the Special Provisions. 
III.  New Penalties: Life Imprisonment and Labor-Training 
The basic penalties in NK included a death penalty and correctional labor [Ro-
dong-kyo-hwa-hyeong] for a definite period from 6 months up to 15 years.  There 
is no penalty of fines under a totally collective economy.  Since 1987, the death 
penalty has been limited to five offenses: four “anti-state” offenses and one 
“murder offense.”  Correctional labor is a just another name for the imprisonment 
with forced labor at “the Correctional Institution [Kyo-hwa-so].” 
Within the 2004 revision, new penalties have been added: life imprisonment10 
and labor-training.  Life imprisonment is available as an alternative punishment for 
the five capital offenses, and for thirteen other felony offenses.  The penalty of 
correctional labor may be imposed for a definite period ranging from one to fifteen 
years.  For minor offenses, the offender is subject to the new penalty of labor-
training [Ro-dong-dan-ryeon-hyeong] which ranges from six months to two years.  
An offender who is sentenced to labor-training is not imprisoned, but instead must 
work at a labor camp, factory, or mine.  Offenders serving labor-training sentences 
are still guaranteed the basic rights of a public citizen.  At present, about two-thirds 
 
 8. THE 1997 CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: WITH ENGLISH 
TRANSLATION AND INTRODUCTION 34 (Wei Luo trans., 1998). 
 9. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xinfa Zinzhu [NEW COMMENTARY TO THE CRIMINAL LAW 
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 5 (2002) (P.R.C.). 
 10. Literally translated, “a Correctional Labor for an indefinite period.” 
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of all offenses are punishable by labor-training.  Thus, the emergence of labor-
training as the preferred means of punishment suggests that a more lenient policy 
is emerging. 
IV.  The Drive towards a Market Economy and its Legal Impact 
The economic crisis since the mid-1990s was caused by the failure of a self-
reliant (juche) economy and the collapse of socialist “brother” countries.  
Economic disaster resulted in a great famine, which caused millions to starve to 
death and caused many to cross the border in search of food.  The Measure for Re-
vitalization of Economic Management was proclaimed on 1 July 2002.  It 
envisioned a new economic policy to introduce and strengthen the market-oriented 
policies including price and wage adjustment, expansion of marketing channels, 
allowing foreign investment, and supply-side adjustment.  The NK authorities 
justified this with official claims that the Measure seeks “the repair or betterment 
of the economic management based on socialist principles.” 11  This change implies 
a dilemma for the NK authorities which have to improve economic conditions 
without undermining the regime’s survival.12 
The new economic trends are reflected in the 2004 revision of the Criminal 
Law.  The “Chapter on Offenses against the Management of the Socialist 
Economy” was re-titled “the Chapter on Offenses against the Management of the 
Economy.”  The number of Articles within that chapter was greatly enlarged from 
eight (1999) to seventy-four (2004).  In fact, NK multiplied economic laws in a 
short period because it urgently needed foreign investment and economic 
revitalization.13  With an intent to resolve the weaknesses of a centrally planned 
economy, new kinds of commercial business are permitted, and new economic 
entities are emerging: individual, agencies, corporations, etc.  The 2004 revision of 
the Criminal Law also focuses on economic regulations on the part of foreign 
trade, quality control of products, and the protection of trade-marks, etc.  A 
violation of economic regulations is normally punishable by less than two years’ 
labor training, which indicates that the authorities will be more interested in 
 
 11. See Tongil Gyo-yeuk-won, Bukhan I-hae [Understanding North Korea], 143 (2006).  [See 
Ed. note, supra, note 4.] 
 12. Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes and Implications, 27 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1289, 1304 (2003-2004). 
 13. See Chosun minjuju-eui in-min gong-wha-guk Bup-Jeon [Codebook of DPRK in 2004], 
supra note 4, at 801-820.  48 of the 112 articles within the Codebook of 2004 can be 
categorized as economic laws.  Since 1998, various laws relating to Mt. Geumgang Tourist 
Zone, Gaeseong Industrial Complex, Sineuju Special Administrative Region, Foreign Trade 
Contract, and Foreign Investment Company, etc. have been enacted or revised. 
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controlling the abuse of commercial discretion, rather than in wielding omnipotent 
powers on all the economic matters.  Of course, such a policy retreat may be a 
tactical option for breaking through the imminent hardship by activating economic 
agents, and encouraging foreign investments.  The 2004 revision of Criminal Law 
suggests that NK authorities intend to encourage more economic motivation 
among individual agents and to secure their controlling power by specifying 
economic regulations. 
V.  Traditional Tools for the Suppression of                            
Anti-State Criminals: Minor Change 
Traditionally, socialist countries have proclaimed a ruthless suppression of so-
called “anti-revolutionary elements,” and often produced the mass incarceration 
system called “gulags.”  Many reports on NK human rights have noted an 
extensive abuse of “Political Prison Camps.”14 
So far as Criminal Law provisions are concerned, the 1974 Criminal Law 
adopted the ruthless suppression of “anti-revolutionary elements” as a guiding 
policy.  “Anti-revolutionary offenses” were categorized as the most pernicious and 
antagonistic offenses to the socialist regime, and “enemies of the working class” 
which must be eliminated.15  Anti-revolutionary offenses were therefore made 
punishable by death and confiscation of all one’s belongings.  But, the 1987 
revision contrasted with the 1974 revision.  First, “anti-revolutionary” offenses 
were slightly ameliorated under the “anti-state” offenses.  Second, the content of 
the anti-state offenses was diminished.  Third, penalties for such offenses be 
punished by death and a confiscation of one’s belongings, the 1984 revision 
allowed for the more lenient option of correctional labor. 
The 2004 revision offers the more detailed version of “anti-state and anti-
national offenses.”  Contrary to ideological criticism that the recent revision tried 
to widen the range of anti-state offenses and to strengthen their penalties,16 there is 
little difference between the 2004 revision and the former law, with the exception 
of the maximum or minimum period of imprisonment.  Rather, the offense of anti-
 
 14. See generally DAVID HAWK, THE HIDDEN GULAG: EXPOSING NORTH KOREA’S PRISON 
CAMPS, PRISONERS’ TESTIMONIES AND SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHS, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA (2003), available at 
http://www.hrnk.org/HiddenGulag.pdf. 
 15. Kim Geun-Sik, Hyong-bup-hak [THE BOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. I] 31 (1986).  [See 
Ed. note, supra, note 4.] 
 16. Kim In-gu, North Korea Revises Criminal Law to Reinforce Insurrection Provisions, 
CHOSUN ILBO (S. Korea), Dec. 8, 2004, available at 
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200412/200412080041.html. 
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state propaganda/agitation or the offense of espionage, which would be applied 
more frequently than other anti-state offenses, receive a milder sentence.  The 
accuracy of the proposition that the 2004 revisions “increased the penalties for 
anti-state crimes”17 has yet to be scrutinized. 
At this time, I cannot anticipate whether the NK government will treat the anti-
state offenses more harshly or leniently.  However, long-term tendency tells us that 
NK is unlikely to become more lenient. 
How about the political prison camps?  NK authorities deny their existence.  
However, there are many reports which have collected some relevant evidence, 
including witnesses of defectors and commercial satellite photographs.  They 
reportedly incarcerated about 150,000 to 200,000 persons for political reasons.18  
The conditions at such camps reportedly were extremely harsh, with little food, no 
medical provisions, torture and death. 
My question here is where the legal basis for such camps is found.  The political 
prison camps are called “Kwan-li-so” and managed by the Board for National 
Security.  Kwan-li-so is distinct from the Kyo-hwa-so which imprisons the normal 
criminals pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Law and Criminal Law.  Kwan-li-so 
is also referred to as “control area” or “the area of special autocracy.”19 
The Criminal Law does not provide for a special institution such as Kwan-li-so.  
Instead, it seems to be a special measure as a form of administrative coercion 
distinct from penalties under the Criminal Law.  According to some refugees these 
“political prison camps” are meant as an infliction of forced labor along with a 
kind of banishment into a remote inland area because a person, by word or by 
 
 17. Vitit Muntarbhorn, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom 
in Any Part of the World: Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea, 12, delivered to U.N.C.H.R., 61st Sess., U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2005/34, available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/101/97/pdf/G0510197.pdf?OpenElement. 
 18. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF, at 
sect. 1d (2004) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS], available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41646.htm.  The Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices-2004 repeatedly refers to the political prison camps in North Korea in 
which “150-200,000 persons” are estimated to be held “in remote areas for political 
reasons.”  “Using commercial satellite imagery to locate the camps and point out their main 
features, defectors claimed that these camps covered areas as large as 200 square miles.  
The camps contained mass graves, barracks, work sites, and other prison facilities. . . .  In 
recent years, the Government reportedly reduced the total number of prison camps from 
approximately 20 to less than 10, but the prison population was consolidated rather than 
reduced. . . . [C]onditions in the camps for political prisoners were extremely harsh and 
prisoners were not expected to survive.  In the camps, prisoners received little food and no 
medical provisions.” 
 19. See Tong-il yeon-gu-won, supra note 5. 
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action, has complained about the dictatorship by “one-man or one-party.”  Such a 
penalty, requiring banishment plus forced labor does not exist under the present 
Criminal Law.  It is, therefore, suspicious that the penalties under the Criminal 
Law represent all kinds of the “real” penalties exercised in NK.  NK practices 
involving extra-legal sanctions and extra-judicial proceedings shall be scrutinized 
in comparison with the normal penal sanctions. 
The existence of anti-state offenses in NK have been often compared with the 
National Security Law (NSL) in South Korea (SK).  In fact, a chapter on Anti-state 
offenses in NK is almost equivalent to the National Security Law in SK.  Now, 
there is a big controversy on the repeal or revision of National Security Law at the 
National Assembly, backed by additional pressure from the civil society.  Some 
proponents for National Security Law in SK have advocated the retention of 
National Security Law, arguing that it would be repealed under the condition that 
the provisions against anti-state offenses in NK should either be repealed first, or at 
the same time.  The proponents of abolishing National Security Law in SK have 
criticized such a defensive approach in that SK has rapidly upgraded its standards 
of human-rights, with the exception of NSL.  In practice, National Security Law 
has gradually been diminished, almost to the degree of withering-away.  In NK, the 
scope of anti-state offenses has gradually been reduced, and its practical 
implementation seems to be gradually diminished.  The disuse or repeal of 
National Security Law in SK may have a substantial effect on the future of the 
equivalent clauses in NK, and the converse is also true in the long-term. 
A.  The Penalty against Crossing the Border Differentiated and Reduced 
Under the 1972 and 1992 Constitutional Law, “a person who betrays his 
fatherland and our people shall be severely punished according to the related 
law.”20  But, in the 1998 revision of the Constitutional Law, such an expression 
was deleted.  This constitutional change was precipitated by the mass exodus from 
NK due to food shortages.21 
 
 20. See 1992 Constitutional Law, art. 86 (1992) (N. Korea). 
 21. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 19, at sect. 2d. (“most observers estimated that since 1994 
there have been at least tens of thousands, and perhaps several hundred thousand North 
Koreans in China. Most crossed the border illegally in small groups to seek food, shelter, 
and work.”).  See also Ministry of Unification, Facts and Figures Item 7: Updated Statistics 
on Inter-Korean Contacts, Reunion of Separated Families, Humanitarian Assistance and 
North Korean Defectors (As of the end of December, 2005), 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 15, 2006).  The total number of 
people who have defected from North Korea to South Korea from 1990 to 2004 is 6,304.  
Between 1994 and 1998, there were 306 North Koreans who entered South Korea.  3,464 
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The original reaction to the massive exodus was the imposition of harsh 
penalties including public execution and incarceration in labor camps.  Leaving 
their home country without permission was originally considered an act of treason, 
or at least anti-state.  But, the explosive increase in the numbers of refugees made 
it burdensome only to depend upon such stern repression.  The 1999 revision of the 
Criminal Law separates defectors from migrants who illegally leave the country to 
resolve their economic hardship.  The defectors who intentionally escape the 
country with a subversive purpose are subject to correctional labor for more than 
five years, while migrants who leave for purposes of their own livelihood are 
subject to punishments of correctional labor for less than three years. 
Now, under the 2004 revision, a more lenient attitude has appeared.  First, the 
expression of “crossing over” has been changed to “crossing back and forth,” 
which means that crossing back and forth across the border happens very 
infrequently.  Second, the penalty against a simple migrant is now greatly lessened 
to less than two years’ labor training.  More limited cases of espionage-related 
defectors who sell national secrets are subject to correctional labor for more than 
five years, life imprisonment or, in exceptional circumstances, even death.  It has 
been reported in recent years that, in practice, repatriated migrants have been 
subject to less severe punishments, or even released after investigation upon their 
return to NK.22   Social change made it possible for NK to assume a more lenient 
stance with respect to its relevant laws and practices.  Though the severe penalties 
are reserved for a threatening effect against the regime-challenging offenses; their 
application will probably be diminished in the near future. 
B.  Hearing of Foreign Broadcast, the Collecting and Distributing of Materials                  
Pernicious to the Authority: a New Criminalization? 
Ten years ago, the attempt to hear or watch a foreign broadcast by television or 
radio in NK would have been suspected as “anti-state” and subject to severe 
punishment.  One could easily be accused of trivial contempt on food shortages.  
But, due to an increase in the contact with outside information, there has been a 
retreat from the initially stern policy.  Now, under Article 195 of the 2004 revision, 
“a person who systemically heard outside broadcasts antagonistic to the Republic 
 
crossed from North to South over the next five years.  In 2004 alone, 1,894 North Koreans 
defected to South Korea.  These statistics show a geometric progression in the number of 
people leaving North Korea for South Korea. 
 22. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 19, at sect. 2d.  It is also reported that an Autograph Letter 
by Kim Jong-Il on the Alleviation of Penalty against those who left the country was 
circulated in 2000.  See Tong-il yeon-gu-won, supra note 5. 
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without any anti-state purpose shall be punished with labor-training for less than 2 
years.”  The same penalty is imposed upon the activity of collecting, keeping, or 
distributing pamphlets, photos, videotapes and printed materials which antagonize 
the Republic.  At least under the text of the new Criminal Law, the simple hearing 
of a South Korean broadcast may be exempt from punishment.  It is reported that 
the mere hearing of South Korean broadcasts are now punished by imposing self-
criticism.  Only the systematical or repeated hearing, collecting, keeping or 
distributing may be classified as a kind of misdemeanor, distinct from a label of 
“reactionary elements.”  Though maintaining a blockade against outside 
communication is one of the focal concerns of NK authorities, the degree to which 
it is penalized will gradually be lessened, with the exception of complaints about 
“the Supreme Leader [Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung].” 
VI.  International Intervention on Human Rights in NK:            
Any Effect? 
The NK government responded furiously to foreign criticisms of the human 
rights situation in NK, claiming that there was “a plot of propaganda fabricated and 
persistently pursued by hostile forces” as part of their psychological warfare to 
“overthrow the State system of the country.”23  The NK Government has stressed 
that human rights should be primarily based on the protection of national 
sovereignty and collective rights, and that the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of the State should be likewise emphasized.24 
On the other hand, NK has showed some respect for international human rights 
standards, albeit nominal.  As the UN Special Rapporteur submitted his report,25 he 
courteously pointed out some constructive elements on the human rights situation 
in NK.  It is a fact that NK’s government, as a party to four key human rights 
treaties, submitted some country reports to the relevant monitoring committee.  
NK’s government has responded to the UN Human Rights Commission.  At first, 
the Government submitted its second country report on B treaty in 2000, the first 
and only other report having been submitted in 1984.  The Government 
subsequently responded to the questions and requirements posed by the UN 
 
 23. Press Release, United Nations Office at Geneva, Commission Hears Reports of Experts on 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Belarus, Myanmar and Toxic Products (Mar. 29, 
2005) (noting response of North Korea as a concerned country), available at 
http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/EB68D35D1A34
5970C12570F1004B6160?OpenDocument. 
 24. Muntarbhorn, supra note 18, at para. 20. 
 25. Id. at paras. 9-18. 
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Commission.  Although its country report and answers are full of legal aspects 
rather than the practical ones, it is noteworthy that NK has started to communicate 
with the international community on human rights.  Of course, it has been pointed 
out that such “positive/constructive aspects” do not guarantee “the key challenges 
concerning implementation.” 
NK’s government has been exposed to the outside world as it urgently needed 
food support from other countries and foreign capital for economic revitalization.  
In order to secure food and foreign investment from the outside world, the NK 
regime had to respond to outside criticism that it had to be open and more 
accessible, as well as improve its situation with respect to human rights. 
Though NK authorities have consistently denied the existence of political prison 
camps and massive public executions, it was nervous about the criticism from the 
outside world.  Facing the bitter criticism on the political prison camps, supported 
by the commercial satellite photos and testimonials from ex-prisoners, it is 
reported that some of camps have been closed, and still others have been 
downsized or removed into other remote areas.  Another example for such a 
consciousness would be the continuing revision of existing laws including the 
Criminal Law.  Its successive revisions since 1987 have targeted some points 
mostly criticized by the international human rights community, in addition to the 
readjustment to an internally changing environment.  “Diplomatic ping-pong” 
between the U.N. Human Rights Committee and NK26 proceed, if gradually, 
towards improvements in NK’s Criminal Law as well as Criminal Procedure, albeit 
in law in text and not necessarily in practice. 
In the long-term, international oversight and intervention on human rights may 
have some influence on the human rights situation in NK.  Contrary to the opinion 
that more sunshine is needed to improve the accessibility of the international 
community to NK society, I want to say that the sunshine policy approach could be 
compatible with the oversight of human rights abuses by the NK regime. 
VII.  Conclusion: The Prospect for the Rule by Law in NK 
The 2004 revision of the Criminal Law can be viewed as a kind of departure 
from previous revisions.  Its primary change lies in the articulation of the principle 
of legality.  Analogy and retroactivity are no longer allowed.  Articles are more 
specified.  Legal terms dilute the ideological tone.  The Criminal Law is more 
focused on the control of economic and social offenses rather than on political 
 
 26. Jiri Toman, Human Rights in North Korea, LIFE & HUMAN RIGHTS, Autumn 2004, at 19, 
available at http://nkhumanrights.or.kr/NKHR_new/index_eng_new.htm. 
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repression.  The elements of the market-oriented economy have necessitated the 
more predictable regulations concerning economic activities. 
The norms which have governed NK were the directives and words of “Kim” 
and NK has therefore been governed almost entirely by administrative directives.27  
The clauses of fundamental rights do not guarantee their implementation.  
Different economic and political environments lose sight of the charismatic rule by 
the Supreme Leader.  The widening contact with the outside world will strengthen 
the importance of the rule of law. 
As NK is more exposed to the outside world, it is increasingly difficult for its 
regime to neglect pressure from the international community, which urges the 
advancement of human rights.  The successive reform of the Criminal Law may 
imply some positive signs, although the clauses on human rights remain a 
“nominal norm” or “a showcase” for the time being.  Although the current human 
rights situation in NK is far different from the law in codes, the development of 
law-in-code can itself be evaluated as “better than nothing” and even “a potential 
reality.” 
 
 
 27. Yoon, supra note 13, at 1304. Yoon points out that “His” word is the principal governing 
norm that supersedes all else, including the law. 
